One important role of corporate governance is to ensure that real options are exercised in the interest of the shareholders. This paper explores whether and how this can be achieved in start-up firms by the venture capitalist retaining a post-IPO equity stake. Our setting is a firm whose future prospects are uncertain and strategic choices remain to be made. The payoff to entrepreneur and shareholders will be asymmetric across the different strategies, leading to the agency problem of suboptimal exercise of options. We derive VC's optimal post-IPO stake under symmetric information and show that this mechanism can alleviate the agency issue. Specifically, VC should only retain a stake for firms with poor prospects and exit fully otherwise. Under asymmetric information, however, VC's of the firms with good prospects have no other way to signal to the public than to retain the stake until the information is revealed. Conversely, VCs may fully exit firms with poor prospects, leading to adverse selection. Finally, although very large equity positions held by the entrepreneur can eliminate the conflict of interest, initial wealth constraints would prevent such situations. When the entrepreneur holds equity stakes insufficient to eliminate agency problem the agency problem is exacerbated.
Introduction:
A large fraction of the value of early stage firms comes from the options inherent in them. In order to realize this value managers must exert effort to keep these real options alive and then optimally exercise them. Unlike financial options that involve legally binding contracts, real options often arise out of implicit opportunities for management flexibility. The absence of formal contracts and the presence of agency problems can, however, lead to suboptimal option exercise decisions.
1 Consequently, the form of governance plays a vital role in the shareholders' ability to capture the option value.
Nowhere is this issue more pronounced than in firms that go public with impending key strategic options exercise decisions. The agency problems are exacerbated in cases where entrepreneurs are still functioning as managers. 2 How then can shareholders ensure that entrepreneurs continue to exert sufficient effort in nurturing the options and make the option exercise decisions that are in the interest of the shareholders? Prior to going public, venture capitalists hold most of the equity, act as monitors, and discipline the entrepreneurs. If entrepreneurs act in their self-interest in violation of the shareholders' interest, then the VC can replace them. In contrast, after IPO, future prospects of the firm will be substantially uncertain and intangible asset values not verifiable by public investors, thus creating asymmetries in information 1 See Dixit and Pindyck (1994) and Amram and Kulatilaka (1999) for reviews of the real options literature. The agency problem arising from incomplete contracting is rarely mentioned but never included in real options valuation models. Although several mechanisms (e.g., choice of capital structure, outside board members, corporate charters, and merger and acquisitions) are available to enforce governance, the focus of the literature is on managerial effort rather than option exercise decisions. See Shleifer and Vishny (1997) and Zingales (2001) for reviews of the literature on corporate governance.
between insiders and prospective public investors. Even if information is available, their diffused shareholding will prevent public investors from exerting the necessary governance control to ensure that the real options exercise decisions will be made in their best interest.
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This seems to suggest that firms with significant options should not go public. But this will impose several costs to VCs by mal-diversification of their holdings and inability to devote efforts to more profitable ventures. Furthermore, the potential threat of expropriation by VCs may dissuade entrepreneurs from exerting sufficient effort. 4 In practice we see many such early stage firms go public prior to the exercise of key real options. 5 How is management discipline ensured in such cases? It is perhaps why we observe VCs retaining a significant stake in the post-IPO firm, often with a lock-up provision that further constrains post-IPO exit.
We propose a descriptively rich model that can explain partial exit by VCs. We explain the IPO decision and the amount of the stake to be sold to the public by jointly taking on asymmetric information, agency, and governance for real-options decisions. 6 This task can lead to fairly dense layers of assumptions -we make judicious 2 In the rest of the paper we will refer to these entrepreneur-managers as entrepreneurs. 3 The literature on considers cases where blockholders may act in concert or in conflict with small public shareholders. See Panunzi (1997) (2000) and Holderss (2003) . In this paper we make explicit the VCs private costs and benefits that differentiate them from other investors. The key conflict occurs between entrepreneurs on the one hand and public investors and venture capitalist on the other. 4 Myers (2000) seeks to explain why firms with asymmetric information choose to make an IPO. Consider a date after which the entrepreneur faces significant risk of expropriation by VC whose equity ownership confers concomitant governance power. In this scenario the entrepreneur will not contribute his effort to the firm even though it may be very valuable for the firm. This benefit from eliminating the expropriation threat by having VC sell her stake in the firm offsets the cost of selling at a date with asymmetric information. Myers's model that explains the VC's exit, however, is inconsistent with the potential payoffs arising from strong governance and empirical evidence of considerable stake retained by venture capitalists. 5 See for example, Megginson and Weiss (1991) and Lerner (2000) .
simplifications, which we argue preserve the key features as well as the model's ability to inform about real-world issues.
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We also discuss manager's efforts. In fact, one of our results shows that too large a stake in the firm imposes strong governance but may have a negative impact on manager's effort. Nevertheless, it may be optimal to retain governance rights due to the presence of real options.
The setting discussed in our paper addresses a rich set of problems. Corporate real options can arise in many guises but all involve firms having the flexibility to make future strategic choices. For instance, imagine a firm that is developing a product around a technology that was developed by the entrepreneur. As business conditions change and technology standards evolve over time, it may be more appropriate for the firm to switch into a different technology. Doing so would be in the best interest of the shareholders, but to the extent that the entrepreneur's personal payoffs are misaligned (both financial benefits and non-pecuniary benefits stemming from his emotional attachments or reputation gained by commercializing his technology) with the firm value, he may resist such a change. In such situations the governance structure of the firm will play a crucial role in ensuring that the firm makes the correct decision in exercising the technology choice option. Other such real options may involve choices between marketing strategies, growth strategies (fast vs. slow organic), management teams (entrepreneur's friends & family vs. professional managers), and production strategies (e.g., location).
6 Gompers and Lerner (1999) note the importance of these characteristics in their book on venture capital financing. 7 Our focus on the equity decision (what mix of equity financing) ignores the possibilities of more comprehensive capital structure choice. We discuss some suggestions for extending our model along this direction.
Although we are not aware of any systematic empirical studies, the business press provides ample examples of firms tussling with governance conflicts when making such strategic choices.
The key point driving these conflicts is the presence of agency problems where the payoffs to entrepreneur and shareholder will be asymmetric across the different strategies. A case that is trivial, yet highlights this asymmetry, arises when one strategy calls for abandoning the business and liquidating the assets against the alternative strategy that calls for keeping the firm as a going concern. 8 Although abandonment is in the best interest of the shareholders, entrepreneurs would be inclined to choose to continue operations in order to reap various private benefits --e.g. his reputation, satisfaction of seeing his technology commercialized, his stature within the firm and his social or business network.
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In order to understand the intuition behind our paper, we stylize the facts. There are three key players --entrepreneur (E, referred to in the third person as "he"), venture capitalist (VC, referred to in the third person as "she"), and public investors (P, referred to in the third person as "they" on indirectly by owning a governance stake in equity.
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At Time 1, once the firm chooses its projects (acquires its real options), some of the superior skills of VC are no longer needed. She then looks for ways to exit the firm and move her funds and skills to a firm that is in its startup phase where her skills are most needed. At this point the VC looks to sell some or part of her equity to outside investors who provide money and expects only to earn a fair rate of return on their investment. Although some information regarding the firm can be credibly revealed to the public, much of the firm's assets are still wrapped up in intangible real options and 10 Although the literature has considered the use of various performance-based bonus schemes and equitybased compensation to remedy the agency problem, most of these features are not feasible for early stage firms where the entrepreneur is wealth constrained. 11 Gompers and Lerner (1999) We allow the VC to hold a post-IPO equity stake that can credibly signal to the public investors about the private information and minimizes the Lemon's problem in the valuation of the IPO. The stake should be large enough to discipline E to make the real options exercise choices that maximize firm value but not be so large that the entrepreneur will hold up his effort due to the threat of expropriation. The signaling and governance benefits due to the VC retaining a post-IPO stake must be offset against the cost of foregone outside opportunities where the VC's superior skills can be more profitably deployed. Hence we find that a partial exit by the VC can be optimal. 12 We assume that the payoff to strategy B is state independent. Entrepreneur may capture rents for his special skills, for instance in the form of vesting stock options or founders shares. He may also receive many intangible and often non-pecuniary benefits. For instance, many entrepreneurs develop an emotional attachment to their technology or business idea and will be reluctant to make rational choices. In other cases, entrepreneurs reputation can hinge on the continuation of strategy A. We also study how VC's decision may vary across firms with different prospects.
The prospects (and firm types) differ in their probability of achieving a good outcome at Time 2. In the case of where the outside public and insiders have symmetric information about this probability, we obtain a threshold probability below which the VC retains a fixed amount and exit fully otherwise. When uncertainty increases, the same firm may switch from complete exit to retaining a stake. In the case of asymmetric information, there can be a separating equilibrium or pooling. Under separating equilibrium, there is a probability threshold below which VC will exit fully. Since firms with low prospects get to free ride on good firms, asymmetric information leads to adverse selection.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section we introduce a formal model and arrive at a simplified version that is able to capture the essential elements of our problem. In sections 3 we solve for the post-IPO stake under symmetric information assumptions and examine the impact of increasing uncertainty. In section 4
we consider the asymmetric information case and obtain pooling and separating equilibria. Finally, we provide some extensions and offer concluding remarks.
Model
The focus of our paper is around the initial public offering (IPO) when the venture capitalist considers exiting the venture by selling its stake to the public investors. The venture capitalist is trading off the costs and benefits of exerting governance by retaining a significant stake in the firm after IPO. The main benefits of retaining governance rights come from preventing suboptimal exercise of options in the firm. The costs of doing so include the opportunity cost of funds, monitoring costs, and the cost of exerting governance rights (i.e. firing the entrepreneur) when necessary.
There are three time points in our model. Figure 1 depicts the timeline. The three players in our model, the entrepreneur E, the venture capitalist VC, and public investors P, make contributions to the equity value of the firm across different dates and phases (summarized in Table 1 ). The detailed structure is then discussed. Notation: "++" = very significant value if participant; "+" = useful value; "0" = no value; "-" = cost.
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Time 0: Firm Starts
At time 0, an entrepreneur (E) combines with a venture capitalist (VC) to start the firm. We assume that the financial investment required to develop the business exceeds E's financial resources and VC's fund is dispensable.
Contracts between E and VC are usually detailed and complex. 14 For our purposes, we assume that the contract specifies the sharing of the equity ownership of the firm -E gets a fraction of the equity and VC gets (1-a), and a wage to be paid to E, R w , after t=2 as long as he stays in the firm as a decision maker. 15 In the model developed next, we assume that E's initial equity stake is zero. Later in the paper, we discuss the impact of equity ownership by E and show that as long as E has limited financial resources to start the firm and derives significant private benefits from one strategy rather than another, the problem identified in the simplified model persists.
Phase 1
During Phase 1, the period between t=0 and t=1, E contributes resources such as concepts and intellectual property, while VC contributes her expertise in managing and governing startups. Through her involvement in the operations of the firm (including 13 The table is incomplete in at least two important ways: (a) the private costs to the players from staying on with the firm or from being removed from the firm are not accounted for; and (b) the spillover costs from VC's continuance after time 1 on E's well-being are ignored. Therefore, it would be incorrect to conclude from the above table that VC should definitely be retained till at least time 2 (or that E must be fired at t=2).
14 For a detailed model of the start-up negotiations, see Gompers and Lerner (1999) and Myers (2000) . For empirical studies of actual contracts between entrepreneurs and venture capitalists, see Kaplan and Strömberg (2003) . 15 See Myers (2000) for motivational details related to the economic rents available to the entrepreneur who continues as decision maker after an IPO.
being active on the Board of Directors), VC acquires capabilities to monitor the firm and its entrepreneur-manager.
Time 1: IPO Game
By time 1, some of the uncertainty surrounding the firm's prospects is resolved.
The firm's assets and prospects become less opaque for outsiders (i.e., the firm has become translucent). However, the success of the business still requires continued effort by the entrepreneur in Phase 2.
At this point, VC has incentive to to exit the firm and move her funds and skills to a firm that is still in its startup phase where her skills are most needed. 
One can think of ρ as VC's private rate of time discounting as of time 1 that differs from that of the market. Additionally, ρ captures any mal-diversification by VC that leads to her risk premium from maintaining a stake in the risky firm to be higher than that of a well-diversified public investor.
Given 1 ≤ ρ , time 1 could be a useful juncture to sell some or all of VC's equity to outside public investors (P). 17 In other words, the firm evaluates an initial public offering (IPO) at time 1. Formally, VC announces the fraction of the firms equity to be offered to the public, p (including possibly zero, i.e., no IPO). 18 Since she owns (1-a) fraction of the equity prior to the announcement, her remainder position is and she receives the entire proceeds from the public offering. v = 0 means that VC exits completely at time 1. If v>0, VC will sell her remainder equity stake at time 2. Since the firm is not transparent at time 1 and/or governance problems remain, P's valuation at time 1 of the firm's equity (P
1 ) may differ from the intrinsic value known to the insiders (E and VC), and will depend on the announced v, which complication is fundamental to our explorations.
Phase 2
During Phase 2 (between time 1 and 2), assuming the firm has survived time 1, E exerts effort which is indispensable for the firm, and the disutility of this effort to E is denoted by e. VC's active participation in this phase is at most that of monitoring which costs m . In Phase 2, new information about the firm's prospects at t=2 becomes available to E and VC (or investors who choose to be monitors at extra costs). 0 ≥ During Phase 2, E and VC learn that with probability q the state of the world will be favorable for the firm t=2, and unfavorable with probability 1-q (the implications of the state of the world will be discussed shortly). 17 Though an IPO may occur at time 1 even if ρ =1 because of the need to possibly mitigate the threat of expropriation to the manager -see Myers (2000) and discussion below. 18 In general, we should recognize the cost of filing for IPO which has a fixed component that introduces a discontinuity at v = 1.
For simplicity, we assume that E and VC have the above information at the beginning of Phase 2, i.e. t=1. In the case of symmetric information, the public investors have the same information as E and VC at t=1. In the case of asymmetric information, the public investors know everything E and VC know except the value of q; instead, they only know the distribution of q.
Time 2: Strategic Decision and Dismissal Game
The state of the world is revealed and observable to everyone at t=2. A favorable state means that the firm is worth H while an unfavorable state means the firm is only worth L, provided that the firm continues to follow its current strategy (call it Strategy A).
The firm also has an alternative strategy, Strategy B, the return to which is independent of the state of the world. Choosing Strategy B will yield a value of S with certainty.
We assume that if the decision is made optimally (in the interests of the shareholders), Strategy A should be chosen under the favorable state and Strategy B when the state is unfavorable, i.e.
.
However, E derives extra private benefits R p from following Strategy A, in addition to his equity stake and wage, but derive no such benefits from Strategy B. Thus, E may choose Strategy A even in the unfavorable state.
To ensure that the decision be made optimally in the unfavorable state, shareholders have to remove E from the firm first. E can be dismissed by the shareholders if together they control an equity position that equals or exceeds g ( 
One way to understand D, the private deadweight cost that VC must incur if she dismisses E, is to consider the cost of building a solid enough case to defend against a charge of wrongful dismissal by E. This cost arises, for instance, due to the challenge for the monitor to make verifiable the privately known information about values at time 2. For VC, D also includes reputation considerations for future relations with other entrepreneurs. 20 For instance, C may arise from inefficiencies in E's management style.
IPO Decisions by VC under Symmetric Information
The optimal equity to offer to the public at time 1 depends on what all the players do at time 1 and time 2 as a function of the offered equity. As is typical in such problems, we start from the end and fold the tree backwards.
Dismissal Game at Time 2
By time 2, the firm's value relevant for the real options decision is known to insiders (E and VC). Each player in the game only seeks to maximize his/her own value.
Consider the case when VC's share of equity is greater than the minimum threshold that is needed to exert governance control (i.e., v>g) and that VC has expended m to monitor the firm during phase 2. In this case VC can decide whether to keep or dismiss E after accounting for her cost of dismissal, D. If E is retained, then E makes the decision of whether to continue with Strategy A or to switch to Strategy B based on his payoffs. If E is dismissed, then VC makes the strategic decision by maximizing the value to her (which will be the equity value accruing to her fraction v). Figure 2 ). We will discuss the impact of E's equity share (a>0) later. From now on, we use the simplified model in Figure 2 (b) for our discussions unless otherwise noted. 
Note that VC will decide to keep the entrepreneur in the H-state if , or ( )
Since admissible values are 0 1 v ≤ ≤ , let denote the equity-fraction threshold above which E will be dismissed if the H-state is realized in phase 2. When D is small and C is large, is low and can be lower than 1. The intuition is that when the cost of firing E is low and the cost saving from firing him is high, VC has incentive to fire E in any state even with lower post-IPO stakes.
( )
In the L-state, VC will dismiss E in order to pursue Strategy B if
Recall that we define g as the minimum stake for effective governance (i.e. being able to dismiss E). It must be noted that ' l might be different from g, and in particular, higher than g. The reason lies in that the benefits of firing E in the L-state -getting S instead of , are shared by all equity holders while the cost of firing E is borne purely by VC.
Therefore, VC must have enough stakes in the firm for executing governance rights to be worthwhile. This means that to impose governance VC must not only have the ability to
do so, but also be incentivized to do so. Formally, we denote the minimum equity fraction for effective governance action as: 
. Under the former condition, E will always be kept as long as but always fired when v ; in the latter case, E will always be kept for any .
We assume in what follows that
)
Under the assumption that l , VC's time-2 decisions are given by: We now formally discuss the agency issue in the setup. When the L-state occurs, it is optimal to switch to Strategy B. However, if E is the decision maker, he will choose to continue with Strategy A due to his private benefits. This is the agency cost to the firm.
Under the H-state, again, E will choose Strategy A; however, we assume that this choice is in line with the shareholders' interests, i.e. S C H > − , and does not constitute an agency problem. Therefore, we introduce Assumption 2:
IPO Game at Time 1
Continuing the backward solving approach, we begin by examining E's problem at time 1. 22 E, who moves after VC, chooses whether to exert effort at cost e in phase 2 (expend effort e). If he exerts effort, his payoffs are:
Recollect that h is the VC's fractional ownership level at and above which she will always fire E at time 2. If , which we assume to be true, E will exert effort for all v , but not for any . But if E does not work in phase 2, the firm becomes valueless in our setup. Therefore, to incentivize E to provide his effort indispensable for the firm, VC should never hold a higher fraction of the firm than h.
The other player moving after VC at time 1 is P who establishes a fair value of the firm's equity, P 1 , conditional on public information including the announced v. Since discounting for time and risk is eliminated by choice of normalization, the fair P 1 for us is P's expectation of the firm's value at time 2, say P 2 .
VC moves first at time 1 and announces the equity fraction she will sell to the public, p (= 1 -v) . If p<1, she also commits to monitor in phase 2 at a private cost to her of m.
23 VC realizes proceeds of ( ) 1 1 P v − at time 1 (less m if v>0) and expects to realize 22 Since the decisions of P and E are separable at time 1 in our model, we can study them in any order. 23 In principle, she could choose to not incur m even if she retained some stake. But recall that m might be near zero (or even negative) because she realizes spillover benefits to her activities with other startups. Several venture capitalists inform us that such spillovers are quite important in early-IPO cases. For our proceeds from sale of her remainder stake at time 2 less dismissal costs if any. Let P 21 denote VC's expectation of the public value of equity at time 2 if she retains a stake below l, and P 22 denote VC's expectation when her retained stake satisfies . VC's value function at time 1 is then: The dependence of P 1 on the fraction retained by VC is explicitly noted via the braces attached to P 1 . The optimal fraction that VC should retain in firm is then:
It is straightforward to compute P 21 and P 22 :
Intuitively, the value P 22 represents the value of the firm when it is expected that the real options in the firm will be exercised optimally. The value P 21 represents the expected value of the firm when no corporate governance mechanism exists to ensure the optimal exercise of real options in the firm, leading to an agency problem which is due to E's misaligned objectives with the firm's strategies. As a benchmark, we define ( )(
. The magnitude of δ indicates the severity of the agency problem. Obviously, the agency cost is higher for low q and high net value of adopting the alternative strategy, S+C-L.
purposes, introducing m suffices while modeling a choice situation about it appears to offer little insight. We can assume that other shareholders may incur a cost M to become monitors. M>>m allowed us to
The value of is more challenging to determine. It depends critically upon the information specification of what P knows relative to VC. In this section, we assume symmetric information between P and VC. When P and VC know all the parameters, . Under the assumption that weakly dominated strategies are never played, VC will not choose any
, it can be easily seen that it is optimal for the VC to hold no more than l fraction of the firm. Therefore, VC's optimal post-IPO stake in the firm is either v=0 (exits completely) or v=l (retains a minimum effective governance stake), depending on the parameters. This case slightly generalizes Myers (2000) in that we find that VC may not exit completely if there is a significant value from his comparative advantage of governance (because of monitoring, rather than screening ideas).
and
conveniently address the comparative advantage of VC as a monitor relative to outside monitors.
It is noted that equals to the value of the firm without governance (in terms of real options). We also note that
when the real options will always be exercised optimally due to the costs of imposing governance represented by parameters D, m, and ρ. We are interested in when VC has incentive to impose governance, and thus improving upon the case of no governance. In particular, we are interested in how VC's decision may vary with different prospects, i.e. different q values. We also call the q value of a firm its type.
Consider VC's expected payoffs for both choices of post-IPO stake (0 and l) as functions of q and denote these payoffs as ( )
respectively. Both functions are linear in q. It can be proved that under Assumptions 1 and 2, the slope of u is greater than that of . Therefore, unless the intercept of
is higher than that of , VC has no incentive to retain governance rights in the firm to alleviate the agency problem.
The shapes of and
also suggest that if VC chooses to impose governance for some firms, it must be firms with relatively low q values, i.e. when the Lstate is more likely to occur. We introduce the following definition.
Lemma 2:
, if exists, is a threshold level of q such that VC chooses v=l for any and v=0 for q . VC is indifferent between v=0 and v=l when .
Recall that the agency problem is more severe for low values of q. Therefore, under symmetric information VC's post-IPO stakes can alleviate the agency problem in firms where it is more serious while VCs choose not to deal with the agency issue in mild cases.
From (2) and (3), we get:
Lemma 3: When q * exists, it is given by:
Next, we present a sufficient condition for which such a threshold level exists and VC's post-IPO stake may alleviate the agency problem for firms with prospects worse than the threshold type.
, there exists a unique positive q * as given by Lemma 3.
When the conditions in Lemma 4 are satisfied, the agency problem in firms with q lower than the threshold level will be alleviated. We also get the following corollary of Lemma 4.
Corollary 1: When
, m = 0 and ρ = 1, i.e. the VC retains l fraction of the firm for any .
Intuitively, as long as the monitoring cost is negligible, and there is no opportunity cost for the funds locked up in the firm, since we assume that the benefits of executing governance exceeds the cost of firing E,
, VC is always willing to retain a significant stake in post-IPO firms to impose governance.
Proposition 1 summarizes the above results.
Proposition 1: When q * exists, the agency problem in firms with is alleviated. *< Lastly, we examine the impact of uncertainty of the firm's prospects on VC's IPO decision. We look at how VC's IPO decision may change when states of the world are more uncertain while the expected payoff from following Strategy A remains the same.
For simplicity, we assume that L = C = 0. Under this assumption, a mean-preserving spread implies that µ = qH = constant while σ 2 = q(1-q)H 2 increases. This involves an increase in H and a decrease in q.
It can be proved that when q * exists, it decreases in H. This means that when the payoff in the favorable state is even greater, the threshold level of q above which VC exits fully is lowered. However, under the mean-preserving spread, the firm's q value is also lower. Which effect dominates the other? Furthermore, does high uncertainty induce
Proposition 2: Suppose L = C = 0. More uncertainty makes the VC who was indifferent between retaining l fraction of the firm and exiting fully will now choose to retain l fraction of the firm.
Proposition 2 implies that when uncertainty increases, the decrease in the threshold level of q is always smaller in magnitude than the decrease in the probability of the favorable state occurring. As a benchmark, a comparison between P 21 and P 22
(assuming L = C = 0) under the mean-preserving spread shows that the agency problem is more severe under higher uncertainty. Proposition 2 suggests that in face of changing uncertainty, VC's propensity to impose governance moves in the right direction and the regime may change.
IPO Decisions by VC under Asymmetric Information
We discuss asymmetric information regarding q. We use the notion of Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE) in defining equilibrium. 
The second condition in Assumption 3 ensures that no particular type of firms can change the belief of the public investors about the overall behaviors of firms.
To determine VC's decisions at t=1, we need to construct u(v) under asymmetric information. Recall that: Since all information and outcomes are revealed at t=2, VC's expectation, taken at t=1, of P's evaluations of the value of the firm at t=2, P 21 and P 22 , remain unchanged under asymmetric information. This is because the value of the firm to be realized at t=2 depends only on the true type of the firm and the governance structure, and it is not influenced by any information asymmetry at time 1. This implies that under asymmetric information, retaining post-IPO stakes in a firm may not only impose governance, but also serve as a signal for VC (informed) to communicate information to the public (uninformed).
What has changed is the value of ( ) v P 1 , which depends on the beliefs held by P regarding the behaviors of VC's at time 1. At time 1, the fraction of the equity stake retained by VC at IPO is the only signal observable to P. Therefore, VCs of different types (q values) of firms may choose different fractions of the equity to retain, v, for signaling purpose.
Since P only observes v, they group firms according to VC's choices of v. When P 
such that VC chooses v=0 for any and v=l for . VC is indifferent between v=0 and v=l when .
The result presented in Proposition 3 is surprising. In Lemma 2, we show that under symmetric information, it is optimal for VCs to retain governance rights in firms with lower q and to exit fully when q is high. In addition, VC's decision under symmetric information alleviates the agency cost when this cost is very high. Under asymmetric information, however, VC's decisions are the exact opposite: she retains stakes in firms with high q, i.e. where the agency cost is relatively low, while exits fully from firms where the agency problem is severe and governance is most needed. It shows that asymmetric information has led to adverse selection! The intuition for this suboptimal result is that under asymmetric information, the VCs are more concerned about communicating the correct information to the public than the governance of the firms. For any shares offered to the public at time 1, P can only evaluate based on their beliefs regarding the collective behavior of each group of firms (in our model, there are two groups in equilibrium: firms where VCs exit fully and those where VCs retain post-IPO stakes). Besides, any particular type of firm (a particular q value) cannot change the beliefs held by the public. On the contrary, the value of shares offered at time 2 reflects the true prospects of each firm: the better the prospects (higher q), the higher the value of the shares.
24 Therefore, good firms (higher q) have incentive to retain more post-IPO stakes for signaling purpose even though the agency problem is not significant. However, the firms are not holding on to any fraction of the firm higher than l due to the opportunity cost of locking up funds (see the proof of Lemma 5).
Proposition 4 specifies the two pooling equilibria.
Proposition 4:
a) VCs of all firms choose v = 0 when:
Extensions
We now discuss the impact of equity ownership by E. Can the contract between the venture capitalist and the entrepreneur be designed to eliminate or mitigate the agency cost and the adverse selection problem identified?
With the wage paid to E normalized to zero, Table 3 summarizes the payoffs to E at his time-2 decision nodes when he holds fraction 'a' of the equity that he can cash out after time 2. 25 However, first and foremost, the reason that VC was brought in is due to the financial constraints of E and E's contribution to the firm may not be sufficient to justify a claim higher than the threshold given above to prevent the agency problem. Second, for sufficiently high value of R p and low net value of adopting the alternative strategy, S+C-L, the threshold for E's ownership given 25 In the extreme case, VC can sell the firm to E.
by L C S R p − + may be higher than 1! In such situations, no contract between the venture capitalist and the entrepreneur can eliminate the agency problem discussed in this paper.
This occurs when the entrepreneur has strong personal preference for a specific strategy and/or derives significant private benefits from it, and these personal payoffs to E exceed the value net value of adopting the alternative strategy. Third, the contract between E and VC is signed at time 0. At this early stage, it would be difficult to form expectations about these parameters (R p , S, C, and L), which may render the contracting solution infeasible or extremely difficult.
When contracting cannot eliminate the agency problem, how does ownership by the entrepreneur impact the agency problem? It can be proved that E's ownership of the firm exacerbates the agency problem under both symmetric and asymmetric information, though the sources for the increased agency costs differ under the two types of information structures. , VCs choose to impose governance in fewer cases (firms) under both symmetric and asymmetric information, leading to higher agency costs than cases when a = 0.
Intuitively, when the entrepreneur's ownership is not high enough to prevent the agency problem, his ownership will leave the VC with a smaller fraction of the firm and thus the VC has less incentive to ensure governance.
Concluding Remarks
This paper explored the use of insider equity held by VCs as a mechanism to mitigate the agency problems that may arise in the exercise of valuable corporate real options. Although our setting is a start up firm around its IPO decision, the results can be broadly interpreted in terms of the block-holder literature. The problem arises when managers and shareholders have payoff asymmetries that lead the parties to prefer different strategic choices. We show how appropriate block holdings by inside investors can be used to ensure shareholder wealth-maximizing decisions.
We also show that optimal equity stake under symmetric information is for the VC to hold an equity stake for firms with poor prospects and exit fully, otherwise. Under asymmetric information, however, VC's of the firms with good prospects have no other way to signal to the public than to retain the stake until the information is revealed.
Conversely, VCs may fully exit firms with poor prospects, leading to adverse selection.
Finally, we relax consider the use of a contractual solution to the agency problem by allowing the entrepreneur to hold equity stakes in the firm. We find that, although very large equity positions held by the entrepreneur can eliminate the conflict of interest, initial wealth constraints would prevent such situations. When the entrepreneur holds equity stakes insufficient to eliminate agency problem the agency problem is exacerbated.
These results help explain some empirical phenomena and suggest several empirically testable hypotheses. Our results are consistent with the observation that sometimes VCs exit fully at IPOs, while other times they retain a significant post-IPO stake.
31
Our models suggest that in industries with well-understood business models,
26
VCs would tend to exit firms that have high up-side potential (high q) but retain a substantial stake to exert governance for firms with poor prospects (low q). In contrast, for firms undertaking new business models (with more asymmetric information) will exhibit adverse selection --VC's will exit firms with poor prospects where their governance discipline is need but retain stakes in firms with good prospects to signal their value to public investors.
